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Standard poverty analysis makes statements about deprivation after the veil of 
uncertainty has been lifted. Nonetheless, the term ’vulnerability’ has been used as a 
tool to remark that uncertainty and risk do matter. In this paper, we define 
’vulnerability to poverty’ as the magnitude of the threat of poverty, measured ex-
ante, before uncertainty is resolved. We describe the desirable properties of a 
vulnerability measure as a set of axioms, and present a family of measures 
satisfying our desiderata at the individual level. We also propose a family of 
measures of aggregate vulnerability, a concept which has remained largely 
unexplored thus far. 
 
JEL Codes: D81, I31, I32 
Keywords: vulnerability, poverty 
 
Contacts 





   2 
1. Motivation 
 
It  may  come  as  a  surprise  that  the  vast,  long-lived  literature  on  poverty 
measurement  has  until  recently  unfolded  under  the  assumption  of full  certainty. 
Little regard has been given to the implications of exposure to risks. For instance, 
work on ‘multi-dimensional’ poverty has strived to develop poverty concepts and 
measures exhibiting sensitivity not only to consumption deficits, but also to meagre 
education levels and poor health conditions. However, the fact that wellbeing is also 
impoverished by a feeling of insecurity, uncertainty and defencelessness remains 
largely unexplored. In this paper, we explore the notion of vulnerability to poverty, 
defined  as  the  magnitude  of  the  threat  of  poverty,  measured  ex-ante,  before 
uncertainty has been resolved. We identify desirable properties of a vulnerability 
measure as a set of axioms. We also present a family of measures satisfying these 
properties at the individual level. Finally, we address aggregation, by proposing a 
family of measures of aggregate vulnerability. 
 
It is surprising that the calculus of risk has not systematically entered normative 
economic  analysis  of  poverty  until  fairly  recently.  Even  Sen’s  (1981)  seminal 
contribution  on  famines  is  in  its  welfare  analysis  concerned  with  the  ex-post 
consequences of the crisis in terms of poverty and destitution. Policy analysis is 
done with the benefit of hindsight, even though the sequence of events unfolding 
during the Bangladesh famine in 1974 and the realised outcomes were just one set 
among a number of possible scenarios ex-ante.  
 
Still,  the  fact  that  poverty  analysis  has  been  typically  backward-looking  and 
oblivious of risks regarding the future does not have to be a serious problem. For 
example, when assessing the impact of a new transfer scheme after it has been 
introduced,  data  on  its  actual  impact  and  the  resulting  poverty  outcomes  are 
obviously  relevant.  However,  when  deciding  to  commit  resources  to  competing 
schemes ex-ante, evaluating which one will be more effective to reduce poverty will 
have  to  take  into  account  potential  outcomes  in  different  states  of  the  world. 
Furthermore, the possibility of serious hardship contains information relevant for 
assessing low wellbeing. For example, consider two families, both with the same   3 
expected  consumption,  above  some  accepted  norm,  but  one  with  a  positive 
probability of hardship, and the other one facing no such risk. Neither is expected to 
be poor, and ex-post we  may  observe them  to have the same consumption, but 
surely the threat of future hardship for the former has some bearing on the forward-
looking, ex-ante analysis of welfare.  
 
The term ‘vulnerability’ has been invoked frequently, not least by practitioners.
1. 
Yet  its  meaning  seems  to  vary  across  the  literature,  and  also  across  the  few 
measures which have been advanced to date. This paper proposes a new class of 
measures of individual vulnerability. To the best of our knowledge, it constitutes the 
first one giving a formal axiomatic treatment to this concept, which allows us to be 
more  accurate  as  to  what  we  mean  by  ‘vulnerability’.  The  analytical  work  in 
Ravallion (1988) provides one of the closest references to our paper, in spite of his 
alternative,  but  still  related  interest  in  the  effect  of  risk  on  expected  aggregate 
poverty. At a second stage, as we turn to aggregate vulnerability, we insist both on 
an  axiomatic  approach  and  on  the  need  to  allow  uncertainty  to  impinge  on 
wellbeing in a direct manner, and not only through the churning of individuals in 
and out of poverty and the resulting changes in aggregate poverty measures. 
 
Poverty  is  a  crucial  element  of  the  notion  of  vulnerability.
2  In  the  literature, 
vulnerability is always more than mere exposure to risk – it is also about deprivation 
and shortfalls. Furthermore, it is always more than mere expected poverty. The role 
of  risk  must  not  be  confined  to  an  ‘informational’  dimension,  that  is  to  the 
difficulties  it  entails  for  the  prediction  of  future  living  conditions.  In  our  view, 
uncertainty has a direct bearing on wellbeing. People suffer and feel wary of the 
future if they have no certain knowledge of what it will bring. 
 
Thus  we  differ  both  from  measures  where  vulnerability  is  some  form  of  low 
expected utility (as in Ligon and Schechter 2003) and from those where it is a priori 
                                                
1  Prominent among its earlier advocates is Chambers (1989), where vulnerability “refers to exposure 
to contingencies and stress, (…) which is defencelessness, meaning a lack of means to cope without 
damaging loss”  (p. 1. Italics  are  ours).  The  World  Bank’s  World  Development  Report  2000/01 
emphasizes addressing vulnerability as one of the three pillars to attack world poverty (World Bank 
2001).  
2  Throughout this paper, we understand ‘vulnerability’ as vulnerability to poverty. For instance, we 
construe ‘vulnerability to an epidemic’ as a shortcut to ‘vulnerability to poverty due to an epidemic’.    4 
equated  to  expected  poverty  (as  frequently  assumed  in  empirical  work,  e.g. 
Chaudhuri  et  al.  2002).
3  We  hope  to  strike  a  proper  balance  by  envisaging 
vulnerability as the burden of the threat of future poverty. As such, it relates both a) 
to the likelihood of future poverty episodes, and b) to the severity of poverty in such 
cases. Individuals dread the possibility of suffering poverty in the future, and they 
are said to be vulnerable to the extent that varying degrees of poverty cannot be 
ruled out as possible scenarios. 
 
Section  2  proposes  our  preferred  axioms  and  the  resulting  class  of  individual 
measures. Section 3 discusses issues arising as we shift to the aggregate level. In 
particular, drawing on literature on multidimensional poverty, we propose a set of 
axioms  leading  to  an  aggregate  measure  sensitive  to  the  threat  of  widespread, 
simultaneous hardship. Lastly, Section 4 provides an empirical illustration based on 
data from Ethiopia. 
 
2. A family of individual vulnerability measures 
 
Let individual vulnerability (V) be measured by V=v(z,p,y), where z is the poverty 
line,  and  p  and  y  are  k-dimensional  vectors,  containing  state-of-the-world 
probabilities and outcomes, respectively – i.e., pi is the probability of the i-th state 
occurring, with outcome yi. We impose yi≥0. It may be easiest to think of these 
outcomes as consumption levels in each possible state of the world, especially if 
poverty is defined as usual as a shortfall in consumption. We remark that we mean 
outcomes  after  all  consumption-smoothing  efforts  have  been  deployed.  In  other 
words, their variability across states is taken as a final word, with no scope for 
reducing it further, e.g. by formal insurance, risk-sharing, or precautionary savings. 
 
For  each  state,  define  ‘censored  outcome’  ỹi  by  ỹi≡Min(yi,z),  and  the  ‘rate  of 
coverage of basic needs’ xi by xi≡ỹi/z, so that 0≤xi≤1. Vectors ỹ and x are defined 
correspondingly. ei stands for a k-dimensional vector whose elements are 0, except 
                                                
3  We ignore here a third, smaller stream in the literature, which understands vulnerability as inability 
to isolate wellbeing from income shocks, e.g. as in Amin, Rai and Topa (2003). For instance, in a 
regression of consumption on income and other variables, the income coefficient would be construed 
as a vulnerability measure.   5 
for the i-th one, which equals 1. We close our notation with vectors ŷ and ỹ
c. Their 
elements  are  all  equal  to  ŷ  and  ỹ
c,  respectively,  which  in  turn  are  defined  by 
ŷ=∑ =
k
i i iy ~ p
1   and  v(z,p,ỹ)=v(z,p,ỹ
c).  Note  that  ỹ
c  can  be  written  as  a  function 
ỹ
c(z,p,ỹ) and will shortly be called the risk-free equivalent to the set of prospects 
described by (z,p,y), in the sense that it yields the same degree of vulnerability. ŷ is 
the expected value of ỹi. 
 
We  propose  eight  desiderata.  The  first  is  the  FOCUS  AXIOM,  which  imposes 
v(z,p,y)=v(z,p,ỹ).  Our  measure  will  thus  disregard  outcome  changes  above  the 
poverty line. If vulnerability is understood as a burden caused by the threat of future 
poverty, it should not be compensated by simultaneous (ex-ante) possibilities of 
being well-off. In consequence, high vulnerability is not necessarily tantamount for 
grim overall expected wellbeing (as arguably in Ligon and Schechter), since the 
‘promise’ of richness in some states can raise welfare expectations, with no bearing 
on vulnerability. 
 
Imagine that a farmer faces two scenarios: rain (no poverty) or drought (poverty). 
Does she become less vulnerable if the harvest in the rainy scenario improves? Our 
answer is ‘no’. Poverty is as bad a threat as before. It is as likely as before, and it is 
potentially as severe as before. 
 
According  to  this  axiom,  ‘excess’  outcomes  yi–z>0  are  ‘wasteful’  and  can  be 
ignored, as far as vulnerability is concerned. Taking this for granted, the remaining 
axioms can be presented as follows: 
 
SYMMETRY  OVER  STATES:  v(z,p,ỹ)=v(z,Bp,Bỹ), where  B  is any  k×k  permutation 
matrix.  All  states  receive  the  same  treatment,  and  the  only  relevant  difference 
between two states of the world i and j is the difference in their outcomes (yi, yj) and 
probabilities (pi, pj). 
 
CONTINUITY  AND DIFFERENTIABILITY. Function v(z,p,ỹ) is continuous and twice-
differentiable in y, for tractability and to preclude abrupt reactions to small changes 
in outcomes.   6 
 
SCALE INVARIANCE. v(z,p,ỹ)=v(λz,p,λỹ) for any λ>0. Our measure will not depend 
on the unit of measure of outcomes. 
 
NORMALISATION.  Minỹ[v(z,p,ỹ)]=0  and  Maxỹ[v(z,p,ỹ)]=1.  We  impose  closed 
boundaries to facilitate interpretation and comparability. 
 
PROBABILITY-DEPENDENT EFFECT OF OUTCOMES. For –c<ỹi<z and pip′i≠0, 
v(z,p,ỹ)–v(z,p,ỹ+cei)=v(z,p′,ỹ′)–v(z,p′,ỹ′+cei) if and only if pi=p′i and ỹi=ỹ′i. Should 
ỹi change, the consequent effect on vulnerability is not allowed to depend on the 
outcomes or probabilities of other states of the world – for a given pi, the change in 
vulnerability  depends  only  on  ỹi.
4  In  the  opposite  direction,  the  effect  must  be 
sensitive to the likelihood of that particular state of the world. Note that pip′i≠0 
discards ‘impossible’ states (pi=p′i=0). 



















If ỹi is greater than or at least equal to ỹj, then vulnerability cannot increase as a 
result of a probability transfer from state j to state i. Likewise, if ỹi is lower than or 
at most equal to ỹj, then vulnerability cannot decrease. Going back to the example of 
the farmer facing rain and drought, we say that she becomes more vulnerable if a 
drought becomes more likely, at the expense of the rainy scenario (or at least, her 
vulnerability does not lessen as a result). 
 
RISK SENSITIVITY. v(z,p,ỹ)>v(z,p,ŷ). Vulnerability would be lower if the expected 
(censored) outcome ŷ were attained in all states of the world and uncertainty were 
thus removed. In other words, greater risk raises vulnerability.
5 Thus we link up 
with our first intuition about vulnerability, as a concept aiming to capture the burden 
of insecurity, the fact that hardship is also related to fear of future threats.  
                                                
4  A possible counterargument could run ‘in fact, there could be some relief in considering that one 
could have done much better had the odds been more fortunate’ (or to the contrary, ‘she may rue 
having missed a better possible outcome, with no fault on her part, and thus her misery will be 
greater’). We ignore  such counterarguments for the  sake  of tractability.  In doing so,  we simply 
adhere to the common concept of poverty as mere failure to reach a poverty line, with no regard for 
‘subjective’ subtleties. 
5  We implicitly define the increase in risk as a probability transfer ‘from the middle to the tails’, in 
keeping with one of the Rothschild-Stiglitz senses of risk.   7 
 
Alternatively,  resorting  to  the  risk-free  equivalent  ỹ
c,  the  same  axiom  could  be 
expressed as ỹ
c/ŷ<1. Expected outcome is unevenly and ‘inefficiently’ spread across 
states of the world, in the sense that a similarly low degree of vulnerability would 
result from ỹ
c<ŷ being secured in every state. ỹ
c/ŷ reflects this ‘efficiency loss’. 
 
CONSTANT  RELATIVE  RISK  SENSITIVITY.  For  κ>0,  κỹ
c(z,p,ỹ)=ỹ
c(z,p,κỹ).  A 
proportional increase by κ in the outcomes of all possible states of the world leads to 
a similar proportional increase in the risk-free equivalent ỹ
c. While risk sensitivity 
ensures ỹ
c/ŷ<1, we now require this ratio (or ‘efficiency loss’) to remain constant if 
all state-specific outcomes increase proportionally. 
 
As compared to the previous axioms, this final property seems less compelling. 
Still, we find it attractive for its contribution both to narrowing down the families of 
acceptable measures to only one, and to securing that risk sensitivities receive an 
appropriate treatment. As for this second point, Ligon and Schechter (2003) were 
the first to point out that some existing vulnerability measures hid some awkward 
assumptions, e.g. risk sensitivity increasing in initial income, at odds with most 
empirical findings on risk attitudes (e.g. Binswanger 1981). 
 
Needless to say, we are avoiding here terms such as ‘risk aversion’ or ‘utility’. We 
intend our choice of language to convey our view of vulnerability as distinct from 
expected utility, if only to stress our departure from proposals where vulnerability 
boils down to some form of bad ‘overall’ expectations (e.g. Ligon and Schechter). 
On the other hand, parallels should be obvious. In fact, the proof of the following 
theorem heavily draws on results from expected utility theory (mainly Pratt 1964), 
necessarily  with  some  departures  due  to  the  specific  traits  of  our  vulnerability 
concept. For this reason and for brevity, it is not provided, but it is available on 
request. 
  
THEOREM  1 – If all the axioms above are satisfied, then 
 
  V(α)=1–E[x
α], with 0<α<1.  (1) 
   8 
E is the expected value operator, and we recall xi≡ỹi/z is the rate of coverage of basic 
needs, and 0≤xi≤1. We highlight the simplicity of this single-parameter family of 
measures V(α).
6 Of course, α regulates the strength of risk sensitivity – as α rises to 
1, we approach risk-neutrality. 
 
A few remarks are in place. First, for those facing no uncertainty and with known 
xi=x
*<1 for all i, V(α)>0. If vulnerability is about the threat of poverty, certainty of 
being poor is but a dominant, irresistible threat. The concept is not confined to those 
whom the winds might blow into poverty or out from it. Vulnerability is about risk, 
but not only about it. 
 
Second, it is easy to prove that V(α) is equal to the probability of being poor only if 
outcomes are expected to be zero in every state of the world where the individual is 
poor.  If  vulnerability  were  measured  as  expected  FGT0  (as  in  Chaudhuri  et  al. 
2002),  then  vulnerability  would  be  overestimated.  Ligon  and  Schechter  have 
pointed out the shortcomings of other FGT choices.
7 
 
Finally,  V(α)  can  still  be  assimilated  into  the  expected-poverty  approach  to 
vulnerability,  provided  poverty  is  measured  as  in  Chakravarty  (1983).  In  some 
sense, one of the contributions of this paper is to identify the Chakravarty poverty 
index as the best choice if the poverty analysis moves from static poverty on to 
vulnerability. 
 
3. Aggregation and the threat of widespread poverty 
 
Given a measure of individual vulnerability, the level of aggregate vulnerability can 
be  arguably  measured as  a  convenient  combination  of  individual  levels.  Simple 
averages is an option (as in  Ligon and Schechter 2003, Suryahadi and Sumarto 
2002), or less simplistically, some account for inequality can be brought on board, 
as  first  advocated  by  Basu  and  Nolen  (2004).  If  a  measure  of  individual 
                                                
6    For  instance,  if  our  last  axiom  (constant  relative  risk  sensitivity)  were  replaced  by  constant 
absolute risk sensitivity [κ+ỹ
c(z,p,ỹ)=ỹ
c(z,p,ỹ+κ), for κ>0], the less attractive measure V(β)=1–E[{e
β(1–
x)–1}/{e
β–1}], with β>0, would result. 
7  More precisely, we should speak about expected individual poverty, as measured by the function 
implicit in the corresponding aggregate FGT index, as in Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984).   9 
vulnerability is available (which was not the case of Basu and Nolen), then it can be 
treated much in the same way as income is treated in distribution-sensitive measures 
of aggregate income.
8 This is a sensible path, yet we do not pursue it here. 
 
Whatever  the  particular  formula  to  combine  individual  vulnerability  levels,  the 
result is bound to imply that a society can only be made more (less) vulnerable if at 
least one of its members is made more (less) vulnerable in the first place. Much to 
the contrary, an alternative approach could allow society as a whole to be sensitive 
to issues which pass unnoticed at the individual level. 
 
Take the threat of widespread poverty. According to V(α), the individual is more or 
less vulnerable depending on her own outcomes in the possible states of the world – 
whether other individuals face poverty in the same states where she does is entirely 
irrelevant. Nonetheless, society could well be concerned with the possibility of a 
considerable section of the population suffering hardship simultaneously. It may 
help to imagine the position of a policymaker: it may not be enough to ensure that 
aggregate vulnerability will be low ‘overall’ as in ‘on average’, and the policymaker 
must pay attention to some particularly hard states of the world with a large part of 
the population suffering simultaneously, except perhaps for dictatorial governments 
with no need to respond to public needs. A relative bias towards averting famine, 
even  at  the  cost  of  some  persistent  malnutrition  may  be  a  reflection  of  these 
principles.
9  In  fact,  a  similar  concern  for  the  realisations  of  aggregate  poverty 
underlies the analysis in Ravallion (1988), even though there, risk is deprived of any 
unmediated effect on wellbeing. 
 
                                                
8    An  obvious  caveat  will  be  the  interpretation  of  the  parameter  of  inequality  aversion,  since 
inequality raises aggregate vulnerability, whereas it lowers aggregate distribution-adjusted income. 












α , then γ<0 and its increase implies that less attention is paid 
to  inequality.  Also,  we  should  note  that  under  this  approach,  inequality  aversion  must  refer  to 
vulnerability  as  such,  since  the  condition  0<α<1  already  embeds  some  degree  of  aversion  to 
inequality in consumption (below the poverty line) into the simple average of V(α) (i.e. γ=0). 
9  An illustration can be taken from Sen (1999), who dwells on “the massive Chinese famines of 
1958-1961. Even before the recent economic reforms, China had been much more successful than 
India in economic development in many significant respects. (…) Nevertheless, there was a major 
failure in China in its inability to prevent famines. The Chinese famines of 1958-61 killed, it is now 
estimated, close to thirty million people – ten times more than even the gigantic 1943 famine in 
British  India”  (p.  181).  So  to  speak,  a  democratic  government  in  China  would  have  feared  the 
prospect of a famine and put into practice effective preventive measures.   10 
Let  n  be  the  number  of  individuals,  and  imagine  n=3,  k=3,  z=10,  and 
p=(1/3,1/3,1/3), i.e. all states of the world are equally likely. Two matrices Y and Y
′ 




























































For instance, Y implies that only the third state (floods) is a poverty threat for the 
first  individual  (y31<z),  whereas  the  second  individual  is  highly  dependent  on 
generous rainfall (y12<z) and the third one profits from others’ distress (y23<z), say 
because she is a speculative trader. Under Y
′, hardship hits them all together when a 
drought occurs, say because they are all farmers. Thus, even though the switch from 
Y to Y’ does not make any individual more nor less vulnerable, society may well be 
said to be more vulnerable under Y’. 
 
On a practical note, this concern for widespread poverty implies that correlations of 
individual outcomes across states of the world will matter. Hence, the formulation 
of  a  suitable aggregate measure can  draw  on  the  literature  on  multidimensional 
poverty (Atkinson and Bourguignon 1982, Bourguignon and Chakravarty 2003) and 
multivariate risk (Richard 1975, Epstein and Tanny 1980, Pollak 1967, 1979). The 
former  is  interested  in  correlations  of  wellbeing  dimensions  across  individuals, 
while  the  latter  deals  with  assessments  of  total  risk  when  two  or  more  factors 
covary. 
 
Again, a set of desiderata can determine our measure of aggregate vulnerability 
AV=ζ(z,p,Y). The following axioms apply with only notational adjustments: FOCUS, 
SYMMETRY  OVER  STATES,  CONTINUITY  AND  DIFFERENTIABILITY,  SCALE 
INVARIANCE, and PROBABILITY-DEPENDENT EFFECT OF OUTCOMES. Two more can 
be added with no need of much explanation: 
 
SYMMETRY  OVER  INDIVIDUALS.  ζ(z,p,Y)=ζ(z,p,YBn),  where  Bn  is  any  n×n 
permutation matrix.   11 
 
REPLICATION INVARIANCE. ζ(z,p,Y)=ζ(z,p,Y⊗1r), where 1r is an r-dimensional row 
vector and ⊗ performs a Kronecker product.  
 
The other axioms need more significant modifications. NORMALISATION must be 
weakened so that only the lower boundary MinYζ(z,p,Y)=0 applies. Since a set of n 
outcomes exist in each state of the world, the risk-related axioms have no direct 
analogues. As a remedy, we imagine a society where Y
u=y
u1n, i.e. any i-th state is 
characterised by the fact that all individuals reach the same outcome level yi
u. We 
may think of this as an hypothetical instance of perfect risk-sharing. We can now 
require that in all cases where Y can be written as Y
u, PROBABILITY TRANSFER,  
RISK SENSITIVITY, and CONSTANT RELATIVE RISK SENSITIVITY must apply.  
 
Note  that  the  condition  Y
u=y
u1n  implies  maximum  correlation  in  individual 
outcomes.  Thus,  in  the  risk-related  axioms  above,  differences  in  outcome 
correlations are inexistent, and hence unable to blur the effects of outcome changes, 
probability transfers, and increases in individual risks. To take account of the impact 
of correlations, we impose two additional axioms, which follow the multivariate 
risk  literature  and  in  particular,  Richard  (1975)  and  Epstein  and  Tanny  (1980), 
respectively. 
 









2 y ]), where  2 y  is an n2-dimensional row vector and  
1k
T is a k-dimensional column vector. As far as aggregate vulnerability is concerned, 
the outcomes of (n2) risk-free individuals do not intervene in the comparison of any 
two scenarios which only differ by the prospects faced by the n1=n–n2 individuals 
exposed to risk. The treatment of correlations remains tractable only by focussing 




                                                
10 In fact, a similar condition typically exists in works on multivariate risk, e.g. Pollak (1967) and 
Keeney (1972).   12 
SENSITIVITY TO CORRELATIONS IN OUTCOMES. ζ(z,p,W)<ζ(z,p
*,W
*) whenever a) W 
is a k×2 outcomes matrix with ws1>wt1, ws2<wt2, and ws2,wt1<z for some pair of states 
s and t, b) W
* is (k+2)×2, with the (k+1)-th and (k+2)-th states being described by 
(ws1,wt2) and (wt1,ws2) respectively, and c) p











The  switch  from  (p,W)  to  (p
*,W
*)  must  be  understood  as  an  increase  in  the 
likelihood of both individuals simultaneously facing low outcomes (respectively, wt1 
and ws2), at the expense of the probability of states where meagreness is confined to 
only one of them. Put it differently, correlation in individual outcomes is higher 
under (p
*,W
*), and society is assumed to be in distress at the prospect of any two 
individuals falling into (deeper) poverty together.
11 In terms of the multidimensional 
poverty literature, we thus imagine society to see individuals as ‘substitutes’. 
 
We can now state our second result, whose proof is provided in the Appendix. 
 
THEOREM  2 – If all the axioms above are satisfied, then 
 
  AV(µ,θ)=µE[(∏j=1,…,nxj)
θ/n–1], with µ>0 and θ<0  (2) 
 
4. An empirical illustration 
 
To illustrate our approach, we use three rounds (1994, 1999 and 2004) of a rural 
household  panel  data  survey  from  Ethiopia,  on  15  villages  and  about  1400 
households.
12 Possibly more than of any other country in the world, most people’s 
perception  of  Ethiopia  is  shaped  by  risk,  linked  to  drought  and  other  climatic 
vagaries. The data requirements for a credible estimation of vulnerability measures 
are  vast,  since  we  need  to  construct  predictions  at  t-1  for  perceived  welfare 
outcomes at t in different possible states of the world.  
 
                                                
11  The axiom of conditional independence allows us to focus solely on a pair of individuals. Richard 
(1975) very early clarified that “multivariate risk aversion is a pairwise property”. 
12  Three other rounds were available for 1995, 1997 and 1998, but they were excluded to avoid 
seasonality issues (rounds were collected in different seasons) and to keep the gap between rounds 
constant.   13 
A  number  of  different  approaches  can  be  found  in  the  literature.  For  example, 
Chaudhuri  et  al.  (2002)  use  a  cross-section  prediction  model  of  consumption, 
imposing multiplicative heteroscedasticity on the error term to ‘estimate’ the risk 
distribution based on the household level variance. A key assumption is that within 
the cross-section, information is contained on all possible states of the world, which 
is hard to accept for covariate risk. Ligon and Schechter (2003) use panel data to 
identify the sources of covariate and idiosyncratic variability in form directly useful 
for their utility-based measure of vulnerability.  
 
Our  approach  is  different  in  at  least  two  respects.  First,  we  will  allow  for  an 
autoregressive  structure  in  our  prediction  model  for  consumption  at  t  based  on 
information  at  t-1.  Secondly,  we  identify  shocks  directly  by  using  data  on  the 
historical rainfall distribution and reported shocks such as illness, price and market 
shocks,  and  asset  losses.  Details  on  specific  features  of  the  data  (including  on 
sampling, coverage and issues such as the low attrition in the data) can be found in 
Dercon et al. (2005). 
 
The  logarithm  of  consumption  was  regressed  on  lagged  log  consumption  and  a 
number of variables expressing shocks.
13 In particular, we first introduce rainfall 
data using a spline function, where a dummy exists for each decile of the locality-
specific distribution of rainfall (usually a series of about 30 years), i.e. each dummy 
indicates  whether  local  rainfall  in  the  most  recent  agricultural  year  reached  a 
particular  decile.  The  questionnaire  also  contained  other  information  on  shocks, 
realized risk outcomes. Our regression includes dummy variables indicating market-
related shocks (e.g. demand or price collapses), loss of assets (e.g. due to fire or 
theft), death of a household member and serious illness of the head or the spouse, or 
of other relatives. Further controls are introduced via village fixed effects (a set of 
dummies) and variables accounting for household composition changes over time. 
                                                
13  Consumption values were constructed using the total value of food and non-food consumption, 
based on purchased items, as well as from the own harvest and from gifts. They were deflated using 
a local food Laspeyres price deflator using 1994 as the base.   14 
To account for the endogeneity of lagged consumption, we used lagged holdings of 
land and of livestock as identifying instruments.
14 
 
Appendix 2 shows the results, based on a random-effects estimation.
15 Beyond a 
strongly significant lagged dependent variable, rainfall shocks matter substantially, 
in fact with a non-linear impact. For instance, significant positive effects can be 
found for rainfall levels between 60 and 80 percent of the usual rainfall distribution, 
but  too  much  rain  is  damaging  as  well.  Other  shocks  do  not  appear  to  have  a 
systematic negative effect (not jointly significant), but serious illness on its own 
does  prove  to  be  significant.
16  Unsurprisingly,  risk  is  not  insured  but  affects 
consumption  considerably.  The  main  source  of  risk  identified  in  this  model  is 
rainfall risk, and to a lesser extent illness.  
 
We can now use this model in each period t-1 to predict outcomes for possible 
states  of  the  world.  For  rainfall,  we  will  be  able  to  use  the  village-specific 
distribution as implied by the rainfall patterns of the last 30 years. For other sources 
of risk, we assume for simplicity that these risks are idiosyncratic, and that for each 
year, the village-specific realizations in the data give the probability distribution of 
this risk. We assume that this village-level distribution is independent of rainfall 
risk. Alternative distributional assumptions were also explored, with only a limited 
impact on the findings.  
 
Using these predictions, individual and aggregate vulnerability measures implied by 
(1) and (2) can be calculated. For comparison, table 1 also shows a number of other 
indicators. The first line shows the logarithm of consumption in each of the three 
periods considered. As can be seen, consumption increased considerably in these 
villages between 1994 and 1999, but remained constant on average between 1999 
and 2004. The increases coincided with much improved weather and a continued 
                                                
14  Land is not privately owned, but user rights are allocated by local authorities, while livestock is 
both a factor of production for these mixed farmers, and the main liquid asset for accumulation and 
smoothing. Together they are by far the most important assets in this rural economy. 
15  The Hausman test provided no guidance in our case (as not infrequent in small samples), but the 
Breusch-Pagan test suggested the existence of random effects. 
16Unsurprisingly, village fixed effects and household composition effects are also strongly jointly 
significant, but will be assumed to be perfectly predictable, so that uncertainty is confined to rainfall 
and idiosyncratic shocks. Detailed results can be obtained upon request.    15 
recovery from very low levels in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a period coinciding 
with drought and the final stages of the civil war (which ended in 1991). The table 
also  shows  some  suggestive  differences  between  households  with  good  (above 
median) versus bad road access and those owning livestock holdings above and 
below  the  village-level  median.  Road  access  and  livestock  are  (significantly) 
correlated with substantially higher consumption levels. Calculating poverty levels 
(using FGT measures, with α=0,1,2 – i.e. the head count, the poverty gap and the 
squared poverty gap, Foster et al. 1984) shows similar patterns.  
 
In contrast, we present two measures of aggregate vulnerability. First, we present V, 
the average value of the individual measure (1), with α=1/3. V does not follow the 
pattern above, since it focuses on expected outcomes. Note that the values reported 
are the values of V at t, forward looking to t+1. While poverty diminished between 
1994 and 1999, we observe an increase in vulnerability. The bottom part of the table 
helps to understand this move: even though the average of expected consumption 
remained constant in this period, when moving to a narrower focus on the poor, the 
expected  number  of  the  poor  rises  in  this  period  and  their  mean  consumption 
declines. 
 
According to this measure, vulnerability in these communities in the coming years, 
as seen from 2004, appears to have come down again to levels similar to 1994. 
However, V with no risk (i.e. valuing only expected shortfalls in resources) does 
remain  above  1994  levels,  suggesting  that  risk  has  become  a  less  important 
component of the threat of future poverty. Moreover, this is not inconsistent with 
the fact that expected mean levels of consumption of the poor that are in 2004 lower 
than predicted ten years earlier (while V remains around 0.039), since this may point 
to lower inequality in the distribution of inequality (see footnote 8, in fine). 
 
On the other hand, these results are mainly due to the use of a particular aggregation 
method (V averages). Using AV, calculating vulnerability based on (2), allowing 
society to fear wide-spread poverty, we do not observe a return of vulnerability to   16 
levels as in 1994.
17 Vulnerability also increased then considerably between 1994 
and 1999, but after 1999, vulnerability is not coming down substantially. These data 
suggest that 2009 poses a greater threat of widespread poverty compared to 1999: in 
general, despite increased mean consumption, vulnerability in these communities 
across rural Ethiopia has increased over the last ten years. 
 
                                                
17  As for shock correlations across individuals, shocks were assumed to abide with any one of the 
observed set of shocks (i.e. possible states of the world preserve the way shocks are combined in the 
population).    17 
Table 1. Poverty and Vulnerability in villages in rural Ethiopia 




  1994  1999  2004  Bad  Good  Poor  Rich 
yt  0.219  0.500  0.501  0.229  0.586  0.229  0.709 
FGT(0)  0.393  0.260  0.253  0.349  0.222  0.390  0.148 
FGT(1)  0.153  0.085  0.086  0.118  0.076  0.140  0.046 
FGT(2)  0.082  0.039  0.042  0.055  0.038  0.072  0.019 
V(⅓)  0.039  0.049  0.039  0.043  0.038  0.059  0.025 
V(⅓) [No risk]  0.027  0.039  0.036  0.040  0.035  0.055  0.021 
AV(1,–2)  0.125  0.217  0.182  0.268  0.157  0.322  0.086 
E[yt+1]  0.499  0.502  0.632  0.451  0.688  0.373  0.829 
E[FGT(0)]  0.220  0.266  0.223  0.281  0.206  0.337  0.137 
E[yt+1 | yt+1<z]  -0.350  -0.439  -0.499  -0.465  -0.514  -0.533  -0.436 
Source: calculated using the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey and appendix 1. 
 
Just  as  in  the  case  of  poverty  analysis,  aggregate  vulnerability  can  only  give 
headline  figures,  useful  for  broad  comparison  between  groups  and  over  time. 
Further insights can be gained from constructing a vulnerability profile, based on  
the  (multivariate)  correlations  of  household  vulnerability  with  a  set  of  basic 
characteristics,  such  as  demographics,  assets,  and  other  general  household-  and 
village-level characteristics. As an illustration, table 2 presents an example of such a 
profile, as well as results for a squared poverty gap index, to show that not all 
characteristics are similarly reflected in poverty and vulnerability. 
 
Many of the characteristics of vulnerability and poverty are shared, as table 2 shows 
for a profile in 2004, using a Tobit model. Adult labour, livestock and road access, 
for  example, have similar  (relative) effects. However,  this does  not hold for all 
variables.  Distance  to  town  is  strongly  significant  as  far  as  vulnerability  is 
concerned.  It has however no significant effect on poverty. This result is robust to 
using the head count or the poverty gap.  We also find that permanent cropping 
areas are less vulnerable than the baseline (which is Kersa, a drought-prone area 
with chat),  but not significantly less  poor. Vulnerability is not  just the same as 
poverty.   18 
 
 
Table 2. Poverty and Vulnerability Profiles, rural Ethiopia 2004  














































































Standard deviations in smaller font. 
*, 
**, 
*** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance levels. 
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[Available upon request: Proof of Theorem 1] 
 
FOCUS,  SCALE  INVARIANCE,  PROBABILITY-DEPENDENT  EFFECT  OF  OUTCOMES, 
CONTINUITY AND DIFFERENTIABILITY, and SYMMETRY OVER STATES lead directly to 
( ) ( ) ( ) ∑ = + =
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1 p y p ϕ , where function w is continuous and differentiable. 
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Integrating  twice,  and  imposing  NORMALISATION,  we  reach 
( ) ∑ = − =
k
i i ix p , , z v
1 1
α y p , with 0<α<1 to secure  0 < ′ w (  and  0 > ′ ′ w ( . 
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Appendix 1. Proof of Theorem 2 
 
Let  i x   stand  for  a  row  vector  with  n  elements  xij.  FOCUS,  SCALE  INVARIANCE, 
SYMMETRY OVER STATES, and PROBABILITY-DEPENDENT EFFECT OF OUTCOMES lead 
directly  to  ( ) ( ) ( ) ∑ = + =
k
i i i, p , , z
1 x p Y p ς ϕ ζ
( ( .  Next,  PROBABILITY-TRANSFER  (for 
Y=Y
u) narrows function ζ down requires linearity in probabilities, so that 
  ( ) ( ) ∑ = =
k
i i i p , , z
1 x Y p ς ζ (   (R1) 








 for any j, provided CONTINUITY AND DIFFERENTIABILITY. 
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 for any j. Next, let  ( ) g ~ i x  contain i-state outcomes for all individuals, 
except for g. CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE then requires that functions  ( ) ( ) g ~ i w x &  and 
( ) ( ) g ~ i w x & &  will exist such that for any individual g, 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ig g ~ i g ~ i g ~ i ig x w w , x ς ς x x x & & & ( + =   (R2) 
To see why, imagine  ( ) ( ) g ~ g ~ i x x =  for all i, such that individuals in this partition 
face no risk. Then, note that only affine transformations of  ( ) ig x ς  can be allowed if 
we intend to prevent changes in  ( ) g ~ x  from causing re-orderings of triplets (z,p,Y) in 
the  vulnerability  ranking,  as  determined  by  (R1).  To  exploit  SYMMETRY  OVER 
INDIVIDUALS, (R2) can be rewritten as in (R3) and (R4), letting either the g- or the j-
individual act as reference point: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ig h , g ~ i ih h , g ~ i ih h , g ~ i ih ig x , x w , x w , x , x ς ς x x x & & & ( + =   (R3) 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ih h , g ~ i ig h , g ~ i ig h , g ~ i ih ig x , x w , x w , x , x ς ς x x x & & & ( + =   (R4) 
For  (R3)  and  (R4)  to  be  equivalent,  first  we  need  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) h , g ~ i ih h , g ~ i ig , x w , x w x x & & = , 
which implies  ( ) ( ) 1 µ = j ~ i w x & , where µ1 stands for a constant. Second, we require 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ih h , g ~ i ig ig h , g ~ i ih x , x w x , x w ς ς x x & & & & = ,  which  in  turn  imposes 
( ) ( ) ( ) ∏ ≠ =
j k ik j ~ i x w ς x & & . Thus we have   22 
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From Jensen’s inequalities, any concave (convex) segment in function r would turn 
the (R7) equality into a lower-than (greater-than) inequality. Hence, it must be the 





, which after some algebra can be spelt out as 
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where  [ ]
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Since the two  curly  brackets in  (R8) must be equal to zero, we  have  a pair of 
differential equations with common solution as in (R6). To see why, note e.g. that 
the first equation can be written as 
  ( )







   
Integration  (or  double  integration,  for  the  second  brackets)  yields  (R6),  after 
defining  the  constant  θ
*,  such  that  REPLICATION  INVARIANCE  holds. 
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 and SENSITIVITY TO CORRELATIONS IN OUTCOMES, sets 
the final restrictions on θ (θ<0), µ1 and µ2 (µ2=–µ1>0), and completes the proof.   24 
Appendix 2. Consumption model 1994-2004. 
Dependent variable is the logarithm of consumption per capita, expressed in 1994 
prices. (Random effects model) 
  Coefficient  Standard error 
Lagged consumption
†  0.537
***  (0.06) 
Rainfall  [83.2]
*** 
  Decile 2  -0.175                (0.15) 
  Decile 3  1.075
***  (0.16) 
  Decile 4  -0.797
***  (0.12) 
  Decile 5  -0.312
**  (0.14) 
  Decile 6  0.646
***  (0.11) 
  Decile 7  0.304
***  (0.08) 
  Decile 8  -0.600
***  (0.12) 
Idiosyncratic shocks  [6.3] 
  Market-related  0.048  (0.04) 
  Asset losses  0.048  (0.04) 
  Death  0.031  (0.04) 
  Illness (head or spouse)  -0.034  (0.05) 
  Illness (others)  -0.099
*  (0.06) 
Village fixed-effects (not reported)  [263.6]
*** 
Household composition (not reported)  [137.0]
*** 




Standard deviations in smaller font. 
*, 
**, 
*** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance levels.  Joint significance tests in square brackets. Deciles of rainfall ordered 
from low to high. 
† instrumented, using lagged livestock values and land values as identifying instruments.  
 